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AGGREGATE LITIGATION GOES PRIVATE
Dana A. Remus∗
Adam S. Zimmerman∗∗
ABSTRACT
In Disaggregative Mechanisms, Professor Jaime Dodge documents how
corporate defendants increasingly design their own mass resolution systems to
avoid collective litigation—what she calls “disaggregative” dispute resolution.
According to Dodge, such schemes promise benefits not only to putative
defendants, but also to plaintiffs—resolving disputes quickly, handling large
volumes of claims predictably, and sometimes, offering more compensation
than would be available through aggregate litigation. She observes, however,
that these systems also risk underdeterrence. Dodge concludes by endorsing
disaggregative mechanisms while suggesting a need for more public oversight.
In the following response, we argue that, left unregulated, such highvolume claim systems threaten transparency, deterrence, and even the rule of
law. We therefore agree with Dodge’s call for public oversight. But we observe
that a number of policing and oversight mechanisms already exist. Today,
lawmakers and regulators police collective arbitration and private settlement
funds, in a wide variety of areas—from financial and environmental
regulations to employment and consumer protection laws. After reviewing the
ways that policymakers currently regulate corporate dispute resolution, we
examine their effectiveness by exploring two regulated private settlement
systems in more detail: (1) regulations developed by the Obama
Administration that require airlines to offer “liquidated damages” using a
preapproved settlement grid when they overbook customers on a flight and (2)
regulations imposed by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency following
accusations that many of the nation’s largest banks executed “robo-signed”
mortgages that required banks to perform a detailed “independent foreclosure
∗
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review” of past loans with borrowers. These case studies demonstrate both the
challenges to, and opportunities for, government bodies that attempt to
encourage sound regulation of mass private settlement systems without
compromising their potential contributions to increased access, equality, and
efficiency.
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INTRODUCTION
Much like everything else in the United States today, American civil justice
is increasingly outsourced and mass-produced. So says Professor Jamie Dodge
in her new article, Disaggregative Mechanisms.1 From grounded cruise ships
off the coast of Italy2 to the tiny “Aqua Dots” beads that once induced comas
in children,3 Professor Dodge documents a rising trend—the bulk outsourcing
of civil justice. When threatened by many similar claims, corporate defendants
are increasingly using entirely private and ready-made dispute resolution
systems to avoid mass litigation.4 Relying on arbitration agreements and
privately-managed, mass settlement funds, they are finding new ways to

1 Jaime Dodge, Disaggregative Mechanisms: Mass Claims Resolution Without Class Actions, 63
EMORY L.J. 1253 (2014).
2 See Nicole Winfield, Costa Cruises Offers $14,460 per Person for Concordia Cruise, HUFFINGTON
POST (Jan. 27, 2012, 3:05 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/27/costa-cruises-disastercompensation_n_1236148.html.
3 See generally In re Aqua Dots Prods. Liab. Litig., 270 F.R.D. 377 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (refusing to certify a
putative class, which consisted of consumers who purchased toys that induced comas when swallowed,
because of a voluntary recall and refund program).
4 See Dodge, supra note 1, at 1256.
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resolve disputes privately and efficiently, without class actions or other kinds
of aggregate litigation. Hence the tag: “disaggregative mechanisms.”5
Dodge shows that the charged, but generally distinct, debates over
mandatory arbitration and large settlement funds are part of the same
phenomenon. Both reflect a comprehensive strategy by corporate defendants to
bypass class actions and other traditional aggregative court procedures.6 For
Dodge, the main difference is timing—while people generally enter arbitration
agreements before a dispute arises, they decide to participate in mass
settlement funds after the fact.7 But whether corporations sidestep the
courtroom through ex ante boilerplate agreements or their own ex post private
settlement facilities, Dodge details how they similarly benefit from outsourced
dispute resolution.8 Relying on commercial economies of scale, corporate
actors hope to resolve disputes cheaply, quickly, predictably, and in a high
volume.9
These goals are consistent with rationales the Supreme Court10 and some
scholars11 have offered for favoring arbitration and settlement agreements. But,
as Dodge acknowledges, disaggregative mechanisms can also impose heavy
costs. They risk underdeterrence as corporate defendants resolve disputes
quickly, quietly, and out of public view. They may allow corporations to
exploit differences in bargaining power with their customers.12 And they may
permit defendants to contract around important laws, undermining the
consistent, open development of legal rules.13 Disaggregative mechanisms
therefore threaten to become even more controversial than the class actions
they seek to replace.14
5 Id. at 1257 (“These emerging systems are based upon a wholly different dispute resolution
methodology than those described in the existing literature—one that bypasses the determination of common
questions, at the core of aggregate mechanisms, entirely.”).
6 Id. at 1257–59.
7 Id. at 1256.
8 See id. at 1258–59.
9 See id.
10 See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–94 (1991) (enforcing forum selection as a
method of reducing inefficiency); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13–14, 17 (1972) (citing
“certainty” as a justification for enforcing a forum-selection provision).
11 See Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering of Public Adjudication, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 518 (2009); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract
Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 856–78 (2006).
12 See Dana A. Remus & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Corporate Settlement Mill, 101 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 25–27), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2414754.
13 See Dodge, supra note 1, at 1261.
14 See id. at 1260.
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In light of this, Dodge cautiously embraces mass private dispute resolution.
She acknowledges its advantages and limits and suggests a need for more
public regulation.15 Her goal is not to articulate the precise contours of an
effective system of oversight but rather to establish its importance in ensuring
legitimacy, neutrality, and consistency. In this response, we build on Dodge’s
insights by exploring a number of ways that policymakers may police mass
dispute resolution.
We agree that, left unregulated, corporate high-volume claim systems
threaten transparency, deterrence, and the rule of law. But we argue that
policymakers already have a number of oversight tools at their disposal.16
Currently, lawmakers and regulators require and oversee collective arbitration
and private settlement funds in a variety of ways. In some cases, they regulate
the process and substance of mass arbitration and settlement agreements
openly and prospectively. In other cases, they rely on retrospective, informal,
and more flexible governmental actions, such as agreements not to prosecute
companies that adopt desired dispute resolution agreements. In all cases, the
core challenge is to encourage the sound regulation of private settlement
agreements without compromising their potential contributions to increased
access, equality, and efficiency.
This Response proceeds as follows. In Part I, we survey a range of existing
public regulatory approaches to private arbitration agreements and settlement
funds. In Part II, we examine two regulated private settlement systems in more
detail: (1) regulations developed by the Obama Administration that require
airlines to offer “liquidated damages” using a preapproved settlement grid
when they overbook customers on a flight, and (2) regulations imposed by the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency following the “robo-signing”
scandal that required banks to perform a detailed “independent foreclosure
review” of past loans with borrowers. These case studies demonstrate both
challenges and opportunities for government agencies that regulate privatized
15

See id. at 1262, 1314.
Professor Dodge acknowledges that “no public [disaggregative] mechanism exists,” id. at 1262, and
that there is not currently a good way to achieve the benefits of disaggregation while avoiding its pitfalls, but
calls for scholarship to fill that gap, see id. at 1314 (“[I]t seems there must be a better way to obtain the
benefits of disaggregation without the legitimacy challenges of privatization nor the costs imposed by the
current backstop of aggregation. . . . This Article therefore offers a call to a new line of scholarship exploring
the ways in which these new private ordering mechanisms are changing not only our conceptualization and use
of aggregate procedure but also the enforcement of substantive law and the nature of the private right of action.
In the wake of this transformation, what is the right approach?”). In this Response, we contribute to the range
of potential responses by collecting and examining current and future legislative and regulatory reforms.
16
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mass settlement systems. In both cases, government actors hoped private
dispute resolution would offer more flexible and timely relief than court for
large groups of similarly injured parties. But they soon confronted other
significant regulatory challenges, such as (1) policing deeply sophisticated
settlement systems at a reasonable cost; (2) preserving transparency,
participation, and flexibility; and (3) ensuring such systems remained current
and legitimate.
Accordingly, in Part III, we recommend two reforms to improve the
disaggregative mechanisms described by Dodge: (1) consumer or other
stakeholder participation in the design of the private resolution system and
(2) administrative regulation designed to avoid coercive settlement practices
and increase transparency.
I. REGULATING PRIVATE AGGREGATE SETTLEMENT
In recent years, federal laws and administrative agencies have increasingly
encouraged or required various forms of private dispute resolution, but with
different approaches to oversight and regulation. As described in this Part,
these approaches vary in terms of timing, formality, and substance.
With respect to timing, governmental bodies may regulate mass settlement
systems before or after a dispute arises. Some legislation and agency actions
lay ground rules for the resolution of future mass disputes. For example, the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority sets broad rules for arbitration
agreements between brokers and investors to guard against the imposition of
one-sided burdens on investors.17 Among other things, FINRA requires that
arbitration agreements (1) alert customers to the presence of an arbitration
agreement and inform them of how arbitration differs from litigation,18
(2) determine hearing locations based on the investor’s residence,19 (3) permit
extensive document discovery,20 and (4) mandate that the arbitral forum
subsidize and, in some cases, waive investors’ fees.21

17 See FINRA Rules, FINRA, r. 12508, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.
html?rbid=2403&element_id=4096.
18 See id. rr. 12200–12201.
19 See id. r. 12213.
20 See id. rr. 12505–12513.
21 See Capital Markets Regulatory Reform: Strengthening Investor Protection, Enhancing Oversight of
Private Pools of Capital, and Creating a National Insurance Office: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 111th Cong. 183 (2009) (statement of Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman & CEO, FINRA).
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Other examples of prospective regulation abound. The National Labor
Relations Board recently barred class action or collective litigation waivers
from labor agreements.22 Congress has similarly enacted specialized bills that
prohibit or regulate arbitration agreements in residential mortgage agreements,
consumer-credit agreements with the armed forces, and livestock and poultry
agreements.23 More broadly, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 provides that parties responsible for
environmental disasters will have to resolve disputes privately, often through
claim settlement facilities, subject to very basic ground rules.24
But government actors do not only regulate private settlement systems
prospectively; they often do so after a dispute arises. In recent years,
government actors have required, or taken into account, corporate attempts to
develop high-volume settlements in areas ranging from false advertising
scams25 to cable subscription overcharges26 to unlawful credit card fees.27
Under the terms of a recent settlement with the FTC, for example, Apple is
required to administer a settlement fund that will reimburse consumers who

22 See D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274 (Jan. 3, 2012). The Board concluded
that such agreements interfere with employees’ rights under the National Labor Relations Act to engage in
concerted action for their protection. See id. at *5; see also Charles A. Sullivan & Timothy P. Glynn, Horton
Hatches the Egg: Concerted Action Includes Concerted Dispute Resolution, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1013, 1015
(2013).
23 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 197c(a) (2012) (providing that “any livestock or poultry contract that contains a
provision requiring the use of arbitration . . . shall contain a provision that allows a producer or grower . . . to
decline to be bound by the arbitration provision”); 10 U.S.C. § 987(f)(4) (2012) (providing, in the context of
the armed forces, that “no agreement to arbitrate any dispute involving the extension of consumer credit shall
be enforceable”); 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(e)(1) (2012) (providing that “[n]o residential mortgage loan . . . may
include terms which require arbitration . . . as the method for resolving any controversy”).
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) (2006).
25 In one case, for example, a magistrate judge was appointed to examine the sufficiency of Newsday’s
own $90 million reimbursement program arising out of an alleged multimillion-dollar false advertising
scheme. See United States v. Brennan, No. 08-MISC-96, 2008 WL 4279570, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2008);
United States v. Brennan, 526 F. Supp. 2d 378, 379, 381 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
26 See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Obtains $2.2
Million in Refunds for 18,000 Time Warner Cable Consumers Upstate (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.ag.ny.gov/
press-release/ag-schneiderman-obtains-22-million-refunds-18000-time-warner-cable-consumers-upstate
(describing the settlement in which Time Warner Cable itself would refund thousands of consumers an average
of $119 in overcharges).
27 JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 2013-CFPB-0007 (Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau Sept. 19, 2013)
(consent order), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201309_cfpb_jpmc_consent-order.pdf
(ordering JP Morgan to refund an estimated $309 million to more than 2.1 million customers for “illegal credit
card practices”).
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were billed for accidental or unauthorized in-app charges incurred by
children.28
In addition to varying in their timing, regulatory approaches vary in their
formality. Some regulation results from formal government action after
legislative debate, administrative hearings, or formal study. BP’s multibilliondollar Gulf Coast Claim Facility was governed by a comprehensive
governmental scheme, the Oil Pollution Act, adopted with overwhelming
bipartisan support following the 1990 Exxon Valdez oil spill.29 More recently,
Congress has instructed both the newly created Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau30 and the Securities Exchange Commission31 to investigate and
formally regulate class action waivers in financial and shareholder arbitration
agreements.
But not all regulation is the result of formal legislative or agency action. In
some cases, the mere threat of a lawsuit or other adverse action may persuade a
potential defendant to drop unwanted provisions from an agreement to

28 See Cecilia Kang & Hayley Tsukayama, FTC Says Apple Will Pay at Least $32.5 Million over In-App
Purchases, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/ftc-says-applewill-pay-at-least-325-million-over-in-app-purchases/2014/01/15/7c2ebc54-7e13-11e3-95c60a7aa80874bc_story.html. The settlement agreement required Apple to pay out a minimum total amount of
$32.5 million (noting that if it pays out less, it must remit the remainder to the FTC). Id. Furthermore, it
required Apple to provide notice to all consumers who it charged for unauthorized in-app purchases and to pay
full refunds “promptly” upon request by an injured consumer. Press Release, FTC, Apple Inc. Will Provide
Full Consumer Refunds of at Least $32.5 Million to Settle FTC Complaint It Charged for Kids’ In-App
Purchases Without Parental Consent (Jan. 15, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/01/
apple-inc-will-provide-full-consumer-refunds-least-325-million.
29 The original bill enjoyed such widespread support that it passed the House 375–5 and the Senate by
voice vote, before passing unanimously in both chambers after conference. See 135 CONG. REC. 28,270,
30,150–51 (1989). Among other things, the enacted bill, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, requires defendants to
establish their own claim settlement facilities to promote finality and to “avoid costly and cumbersome
litigation.” Johnson v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 830 F. Supp. 309, 310–11 (E.D. Va. 1993) (citing 135 CONG.
REC. H7962, H7965 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1989) (statements of Rep. Lent and Rep. Hammerschmidt)) (relying on
the OPA’s legislative history to dismiss the litigation because the plaintiff failed to exhaust remedies through
defendant’s settlement facility); accord 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2012); Boca Ciego Hotel, Inc. v. Bouchard
Transp. Co., 51 F.3d 235, 240 (11th Cir. 1995).
30 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376, 1964, 2151 (codified in sections 7, 12, and 15 of the U.S.C.).
31 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(o) (granting the SEC authority to “prohibit, or impose conditions or limitations on
the use of, agreements that require customers or clients . . . to arbitrate any future dispute between them arising
under the Federal securities laws, the rules and regulations thereunder, or the rules of a self-regulatory
organization if it finds that such prohibition, imposition of conditions, or limitations are in the public interest
and for the protection of investors” (emphasis added)).
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arbitrate.32 The Carlyle Group, a giant private equity firm, dropped a
controversial effort to require that its future shareholders waive rights to
collective litigation and pursue mandatory arbitration after consulting with the
SEC.33 The SEC only had to warn that its staff “was not prepared” to clear
Carlyle’s regulatory filing to go public with its controversial provisions for
arbitration.34
Finally, regulatory approaches vary in their target, with some focusing on
the process and others on the substance of mass dispute resolution agreements.
Some regulation identifies best practices for settlement procedures, setting
forth guidelines and rules for corporations that design their own mass dispute
resolution programs. For example, the Department of Labor has recommended
that corporations adopt in-house ADR systems in response to a 400% increase
in employment grievances over twenty years.35 Among other things, the DOL
strongly advised that such dispute resolution systems should (1) include the
participation of employees and employee committees in their design,
investigations, and hearings; (2) provide for neutral arbitrators and very limited
discovery; and (3) be offered only after a dispute arises and not be made a
condition of employment.36
Other regulatory approaches may address the substance of the ultimate
agreement. The Oil Pollution Act, discussed above, requires responsible parties
to offer emergency payments and relief to injured parties in the wake of a
devastating spill and prohibits them from conditioning receipt on a waiver of
legal rights to additional funds.37
32 See Greg Roumeliotis & Jonathan Stempel, Carlyle Retreats on Shareholder Lawsuit Ban, REUTERS
(Feb. 3, 2012, 6:16 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/03/carlyle-idUSL5E8D34FF20120203.
33 Id.
34 Id.; see also Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Investor Protection Meets the Federal Arbitration Act, 1
STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 1, 7–8 (2012).
35 See Office of the Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, IV. Employment Litigation and Dispute Resolution, U.S.
DEP’T LAB., http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/dunlop/section4.htm (last visited May 16, 2014). The
regulation of ADR in employment cases was the product of intensive study and promotion by “a Special Task
Force created by the leaderships of the National Academy of Arbitrators, the American Bar Association, the
American Civil Liberties Union, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the Society of Professionals
in Dispute Resolution, and the National Employment Lawyers Association.” Paul D. Carrington & Paul H.
Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 371–72; see also Arnold M. Zack, Arbitration as
a Tool to Unclog Government and the Judiciary: The Due Process Protocol as an International Model, 7
WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 10, 10 (1996). Their proposed protocol required “an equal role for the
employee in selecting the arbitrator, discovery, and review for errors of law.” See Carrington & Haagen, supra,
at 372.
36 See Office of the Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 35.
37 See 33 U.S.C. § 2715 (2012); see also supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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These distinct regulatory approaches—ex ante versus ex post, formal versus
informal, and procedural versus substantive—do not establish six mutually
exclusive categories of regulation. They do, however, illustrate a diverse range
of existing approaches to the regulation of private settlement arrangements,
which extends far beyond court oversight.
II. TWO EXAMPLES OF EXISTING PRIVATE REGULATION
In this Part, we describe in more detail two recently adopted governmentregulated settlement systems, one involving bumped airline passengers and the
other, the mortgage foreclosure crisis. The former was formal, prospective
regulation adopted after several years of administrative hearings and legislative
debate involving airlines, consumers, and other interest groups. The latter was
ex post and informal—after years of failed attempts in Congress to respond to a
growing housing crisis, federal and state officials quietly brokered the terms of
a multibillion-dollar settlement agreement for struggling homeowners. Both
regulated settlement systems struggled with similar challenges in calculating
damages, notifying claimants of their rights, and ensuring effective monitoring.
But together, they suggest new opportunities for government actors who hope
to encourage fair outcomes in mass settlements without compromising their
stated goals of increased legal access, consistency, and efficiency.
A. Airlines
Airlines regularly and intentionally overbook flights. By selling more
tickets than seats, they can account for inevitable last minute cancellations and
no-shows and optimize the number of filled seats on each flight.38 Travelers in
the aggregate benefit from this practice, as it allows for flexible reservation and
cancellation policies and reduces pressures on higher fares.39 Recognizing
these advantages, federal regulators have not prohibited the practice.40 Instead,
they require airlines to adopt regulated settlement practices designed to
allocate the risk of overbooking to the least inconvenienced travelers while
guaranteeing some compensation to bumped passengers.41
38 See Elliott Blanchard, Note, Terminal 250: Federal Regulation of Airline Overbooking, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1799, 1802 (2004).
39 See id. at 1803–04.
40 See 14 C.F.R. § 250.2a (2013).
41 See id. §§ 250.2a–.2b, 250.5; Oversales, 47 Fed. Reg. 52,980, 52,982 (Nov. 24, 1982) (codified at 14
C.F.R. pt. 250) (“The rule facilitates the resolution of airline-passenger disputes because passengers are
immediately informed of their rights and options. There is no question about how much and when a passenger
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In 1978, the now-defunct Civil Aeronautics Board issued regulations that
required airlines to offer “liquidated damages” to passengers who were
involuntarily bumped from overbooked flights.42 This now-familiar “denied
boarding compensation” program involved two steps. First, airlines had to ask
passengers on overbooked flights to give up their confirmed reservations
voluntarily in exchange for some agreed-upon compensation, often set by the
airline.43 If that process failed, the airline had to provide government-set
compensation for passengers involuntarily bumped off the plane, according to
a fixed schedule with a statutory maximum.44 Under the 1978 regulations, an
involuntarily bumped passenger who suffered up to a two-hour delay in arrival
time received 100% of the value of the ticket, up to a maximum of $200; if the
delay exceeded two hours, the passenger received 200% of the value of the
ticket, up to a maximum of $400.45
These statutory ceilings remained constant until the Obama Administration
revisited the denied boarding regulations in 2008. Under current regulation, an
involuntarily bumped passenger who suffers a delay of between one and two
hours (up to four hours for international flights) now receives 200% of the
customer’s airfare up to a maximum of $650.46 After two hours, the
compensation doubles.47 The new rules require compensation even for
passengers traveling on frequent flier tickets.48 They also provide for an
inflation-based increase in the $650 and $1,300 statutory ceilings every two
years.49
The federal regulations account for the advantages that overbooking at an
appropriate level can deliver to airlines and passengers alike, while recognizing
that the costs of overbooking practices fall exclusively and unfairly on a small
must be paid. The problem is generally resolved on the spot, thus maintaining passenger goodwill and
eliminating the need for costly lawsuits.”); see also Note, Federal Preemption of State Law: The Example of
Overbooking in the Airline Industry, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1200, 1201–02 (1976) (noting that the rule was spurred
by passenger anger at “ticketing time limits” and the “imposition of reservation service charges”).
42 See 14 C.F.R. § 250.4(b) (1982); Priority Rules, Denied-Boarding Compensation Tariffs and Reports
of Unaccommodated Passengers, 41 Fed. Reg. 16,478, 16,478 (Apr. 19, 1976) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 250).
43 14 C.F.R. § 250.2b(a).
44 Id. §§ 250.2b(b), 250.5.
45 Id. § 250.5.
46 Id. §§ 250.5(a), 250.9 (2013).
47 Id. § 250.5(a).
48 Id. § 250.5(d).
49 See id. § 250.2b (providing the procedures for requesting volunteers); id. § 250.5 (discussing
involuntary-bumping compensation); id. § 250.10 (providing the reporting requirements of bumped
passengers); id. § 250.11 (discussing the public disclosure requirements of deliberate overbooking and
boarding procedures).
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minority of travelers, who are involuntarily bumped. Because individuals are
not likely to have the financial resources or incentives to sue, the regulatory
scheme offers efficient access to compensation.
But while facilitating a practice that is broadly considered desirable at
appropriate levels, the airline compensation program also illustrates three
difficulties with substantive, prospective, and formal settlement arrangements.
The first is determining how much compensation is enough. Just as consumers
criticized the mandatory payments as too low, many international carriers
argued they were too high—such that they would chill overbooking practices,
and, ultimately, increase fares.50 Moreover, a uniform system of damages may
punish airlines that choose not to overbook and reward airlines that frequently
overbook.51 This illustrates one of the difficulties of ex ante regulation—
policymakers will lack accurate information regarding the value of an injury
before it has occurred.
The second difficulty, even for formal and open forms of regulation, is
ensuring sufficient notice and public participation. Notwithstanding statutory
disclosure requirements,52 many travelers remain unaware of their legal rights,
either because the airlines are not complying with the requirements or because
the requirements are an ineffective means of placing passengers on actual
notice.53 Accordingly, while the overwhelming majority of overbooked and
bumped passengers accept what airlines offer, this may just reflect a lack of
awareness that bumped passengers are legally entitled to more.54
The third and final difficulty entails effective monitoring and enforcement
to ensure compliance with mass settlement regulations. In the absence of
sufficient oversight, some airlines have taken advantage of unsophisticated
passengers to evade the airline compensation regulations. In 2012, for
50 See Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,110, 23,135 (Apr. 25, 2011) (codified at
14 C.F.R. pts. 244, 250, 253, 259, and 399) (summarizing the objections of consumer groups, AirTran
Airways, and Virgin Atlantic).
51 Blanchard, supra note 38, at 1811.
52 Airlines are required to advise any volunteer whether he or she might be involuntarily bumped and, if
that were to occur, the amount of compensation that would be due. 14 C.F.R. § 250.2b(b). They are required to
give involuntarily bumped passengers a written statement describing their legal rights. Id. § 250.9(a).
53 See Christopher Elliott, A Long, Bumpy Ride to Denied-Boarding Compensation, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 25,
2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-12-25/travel/sns-201212211100—tms—traveltrctntt-ee2012122
5-20121225_1_passenger-rights-departure-time-flight-vouchers (“Few air travelers know that there are rules
governing oversales, so it isn’t uncommon to see passengers simply walk away when they’re bumped, without
asking for any compensation.”).
54 See id.
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example, United Airlines refused compensation to an individual bumped from
a fifty-seat regional jet,55 citing an exemption to the rules for aircrafts with
fewer than sixty seats where extra passengers would prevent the plane from
operating safely.56 United eventually agreed to compensation, but only after
the individual, who was an Air Force attorney, carefully read the regulations
and filed suit in Virginia district court.57 Meanwhile, a DOT “investigation
found that ‘on numerous instances’ in 2009, Southwest either failed to pay
bumped passengers the appropriate amount or failed to inform them that they
were entitled to cash instead of a voucher.”58
B. Mortgage Foreclosure Review
In contrast to airline compensation, the regulation of mortgage foreclosure
payouts was retrospective, informal, and largely procedural. After years of
failed legislative attempts to respond to the mortgage foreclosure crisis,59
federal and state officials covertly brokered the terms of a multibillion-dollar
settlement agreement.60 But much like the airline compensation program, the
foreclosure review struggled to calculate damages, notify homeowners, and
effectively monitor dispute resolution between mortgage banks and distressed
borrowers.
In April 2011, following accusations that many of the nation’s largest
banks executed “robo-signed” mortgages and engaged in “[u]nsafe and

55

Id.
See id. According to the article, the DOT said the regulation “is unambiguous and as written
completely exempts only planes with 30 or fewer seats.” Id. Planes with sixty or fewer seats are only exempt
where the bumping is for safety reasons. See id.
57 Id.
58 Hugo Martin, Southwest Fined for ‘Bumping,’ L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/
2010/apr/28/business/la-fi-southwest-fine-20100428.
59 See, e.g., CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, AN ASSESSMENT OF FORECLOSURE MITIGATION EFFORTS AFTER
SIX MONTHS 1, 97 (2009); CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING TOWARD A SOLUTION
1–4, 11, 14, 37, 48 (2009). The few government programs that executive policymakers adopted without
Congress also failed. The FHASecure refinancing program refinanced only around 4,100 delinquent borrowers
before the program ended in December 2008. See Michael Corkery, Mortgage ‘Cram-Downs’ Loom as
Foreclosures Mount, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2008, at C1. The HOPE for Homeowners program refinanced only
130 loans between October 2008 and September 2010. Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing,
28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 4 n.5 (2011).
60 See Helping Homeowners Harmed by Foreclosures: Ensuring Accountability and Transparency in
Foreclosure Reviews: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous., Transp., & Cmty. Dev. of the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 114 (2011) [hereinafter Helping Homeowners I] (testimony of
Anthony B. Sanders, Professor of Real Estate Finance, George Mason University).
56
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unsound practices,”61 the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office
of Thrift Supervision, and the Federal Reserve entered into a landmark
settlement with major mortgage-servicing banks.62 The settlement required that
the banks perform an independent review of loans for which foreclosure was
“initiated, pending, or completed during 2009 or 2010” upon request of the
borrower.63 The intent of the reviews was to identify wrongdoing by mortgage
servicers in individual foreclosure cases and to compensate the victims
appropriately.64
The Independent Foreclosure Review program operated in tandem with the
National Mortgage Settlement, which was announced nine months later.65 An
agreement among the U.S. attorney general, forty-nine state attorneys general,
and five of the largest mortgage servicers, the National Mortgage Settlement
was designed to offer fast and automatic payouts, in the range of $1,500 to
$2,000, to borrowers who had lost their homes to foreclosure.66 In response to
critics of its one-size-fits-all approach, proponents cited the Independent
Foreclosure Review as a program that would offer an individualized and
neutral review.67
Like the airline compensation system, the Independent Foreclosure Review
illustrates many of the potential strengths and efficiencies of out-of-court
61 See Failure to Recover: The State of Housing Markets, Mortgage Servicing Practices, and
Foreclosures: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. 3–4 (2012)
[hereinafter Failure to Recover] (internal quotation mark omitted) (statements of Rep. Darrell Issa, Chairman,
H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform; and Rep. Elijah E. Cummings, Member, H. Comm. on Oversight &
Gov’t Reform).
62 Helping Homeowners I, supra note 60, at 38 (statement of Julie L. Williams, First Senior Deputy
Comptroller and Chief Counsel, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency).
63 What You Need to Know: Independent Foreclosure Review, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS. (Jan.
27, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/consumerinfo/independent-foreclosure-review.htm.
64 See id.
65 See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen., State Attorneys General, Feds Reach $25 Billion
Settlement with Five Largest Mortgage Servicers on Foreclosure Wrongs (Feb. 9, 2012), http://naag.org/stateattorneys-general-feds-reach-25-billion-settlement-with-five-largest-mortgage-servicers-on-foreclosurewrongs.php.
66 Morgan Brennan, How the $25 Billion Foreclosure Settlement Will Really Affect the Housing Market,
FORBES (Feb. 9, 2012, 4:31 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/morganbrennan/2012/02/09/how-the-25-billionforeclosure-settlement-will-really-affect-the-housing-market/.
67 See, e.g., Broderick Perkins, National Foreclosure Review Offers Potential $100,000 or More per
Household, but Deadline Looms for Millions, DEADLINENEWS.COM (May 30, 2012), http://www.
deadlinenews.com/2012/05/30/national-foreclosure-review-offers-potential-100000-or-more-per-householdbut-deadline-looms-for-millions/; see also Help for Homeowners, NAT’L MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT, http://
www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/help (last visited May 16, 2014) (“[B]orrowers will not . . . relinquish
the right to participate in the independent review process being conducted by federal banking regulators.”).

REMUS_ZIMMERMAN GALLEYSPROOFS

1330

6/30/2014 1:56 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:1317

settlement systems. In theory, it offered efficient access to compensation to
qualifying borrowers, who might lack the resources to bring a challenge in
court.68 Whereas litigation could last for years, the OCC aspired to make the
Independent Foreclosure Review prompt and efficient.69 Moreover, it was
designed to offer individualized recourse, using information about actual losses
to calculate damages (and thus, minimizing the difficulties of ex ante
calculations like with the airline regulations).70 And while waiting for
individualized review, borrowers could receive immediate (albeit incomplete)
relief through the National Mortgage Settlement.71
Once implemented, however, the program was quickly bogged down in
problems, illustrating the risks associated with regulated settlement
agreements.72 The individualized reviews were much more complex, timeconsuming, and expensive than anticipated.73 As with the airline regulations,
ensuring adequate and meaningful notice was a problem, leading to low
participation levels.74 In addition, the OCC failed to monitor and oversee the
program to ensure consistent and truly independent reviews.75 The banks hired
independent consulting firms to conduct the reviews,76 but the OCC permitted
the banks themselves to do much of the work of reviewing the loans and

68 See Failure to Recover, supra note 61, at 14, 18–26 (statement of Morris Morgan, Deputy
Comptroller, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) (describing the independent foreclosure review
process).
69 See id. at 18, 21.
70 See Helping Homeowners I, supra note 60, at 5–6 (statement of Julie L. Williams, First Senior Deputy
Comptroller and Chief Counsel, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency).
71 See About the Settlement, NAT’L MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT, http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.
com/about (last visited May 16, 2014).
72 See Helping Homeowners I, supra note 60, at 51–79 (statement of Alys Cohen, Staff Attorney,
National Consumer Law Center).
73 See id. at 51–87.
74 See id. at 65. Many homeowners thought the letter was a scam, didn’t know how to fill it out, or didn’t
understand what they stood to gain from filling it out. CAL. REINVESTMENT COAL., CHASM BETWEEN WORDS
AND DEEDS VIII: LACK OF BANK ACCOUNTABILITY PLAGUES CALIFORNIANS 10 (2012), http://www.
calreinvest.org/system/resources/W1siZiIsIjIwMTIvMDQvMTIvMDJfMjJfMjJfMjEwX0NvdW5zZWxvclN1
cnZleUZJTkFMLnBkZiJdXQ/CounselorSurveyFINAL.pdf.
75 See Helping Homeowners Harmed by Foreclosures: Ensuring Accountability and Transparency in
Foreclosure Reviews—Part II: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous., Transp., & Cmty. Dev. of the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 23, 29–31 (2013) [hereinafter Helping Homeowners
II] (statement of Lawrance L. Evans, Jr., Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment, U.S.
Government Accountability Office). Among other things, the GAO found that the OCC’s Independent
Foreclosure Review suffered because “regulators missed opportunities to develop common criteria or
reference documents to help consultants navigate complexities involving State foreclosure law.” Id. at 3.
76 See Helping Homeowners I, supra note 60, at 66 (statement of Alys Cohen, Staff Attorney, National
Consumer Law Center).
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gathering the information that would determine whether and how much a
homeowner would be compensated.77 The OCC’s decision to rely on the very
institutions implicated in the foreclosure crisis to compensate aggrieved
borrowers is a common feature of many mass dispute resolution systems. In
the interest of efficiency, public officials often depend on private parties most
familiar with the nature of the claims.78 Here, for example, the OCC cited the
banks’ comparative expertise in evaluating distressed loans. But the additional
efficiency can come at the price of accountability, which was evident here. A
recent study by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau showed that banks
profited by deliberately underinvesting in their servicing processes.79 And
although federal regulators intended to combat such problems by maintaining
an oversight role, they reviewed only a miniscule number of the total
foreclosure files—far less than a statistically reliable sample.80
These problems proved to be so great that in January 2013, with fewer than
104,000 reviews completed, regulators announced a new agreement with most
of the banks to replace the independent review process with direct payouts.81
The direct payouts, which would range from $300 to $125,000, would go to
homeowners who had been in some stage of foreclosure in 2009 or 2010,
regardless of whether there was evidence of wrongdoing by the banks.82 The
amount would be determined by a matrix that accounted for the stage of the
foreclosure process and whether the borrower had requested review under the
Independent Foreclosure Review process.83
77 See id. at 73. Accordingly, although the independent consultants technically made the compensation
decisions, those decisions were based on work performed by the banks themselves. See id. at 72. Moreover,
while the banks had the opportunity to challenge the decisions before they became final, homeowners had no
such opportunity. See id. at 73.
78 See Remus & Zimmerman, supra note 12 (manuscript at 22).
79 Cf. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB STUDY OF OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS: A WHITE PAPER OF
INITIAL DATA FINDINGS 4–7 (2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_whitepaper_overdraftpractices.pdf (highlighting costly and often unnecessary overdraft protection programs).
80 See Helping Homeowners II, supra note 75, at 3 (statement of Lawrance L. Evans, Jr., Director,
Financial Markets and Community Investment, U.S. Government Accountability Office).
81 See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Regulators and 13 Banks Complete $9.3 Billion Deal for Foreclosure
Relief, DEALBOOK (Feb. 28, 2013, 12:24 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/28/regulators-and-13banks-complete-9-3-billion-deal-for-foreclosure-relief/. This would include $3.6 billion in direct compensation
to eligible homeowners and $5.7 billion allocated for loan modifications, forgiveness of deficiency judgments,
and other mortgage assistance. See id.
82 See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. & Office of the Comptroller of
Currency, Payments to 4.2 Million Borrowers Covered by Foreclosure Agreement to Begin April 12 (Apr. 9,
2013), http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2013/nr-ia-2013-60.html.
83 Id. (“In determining the payment amounts, borrowers were categorized according to the stage of their
foreclosure process and the type of possible servicer error. Regulators then determined amounts for each
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In announcing the new plan, OCC Director Thomas Curry explained that it
would “get more money to more people more quickly.”84 Stated otherwise, it
would achieve the benefits of private aggregate settlement systems—efficient
recourse to large numbers of people. But it would also come at the cost of
individualized review and compensation. The settlement continued to offer
some variation in payouts, and therefore remained distinct from the National
Mortgage Settlement’s one-size-fits-all approach.85 But in place of individual
case review, regulators relied on a rigid matrix to determine the likely value of
homeowners’ injuries.86 This ensured less accurate compensation and fewer
answers about how banks themselves contributed to the mortgage foreclosure
crisis. As many critics of the settlement pointed out, government actors
terminated the review process before a sufficient number of reviews were
completed to determine the full scope of harm that occurred.87 Congressman
Elijah Cummings of Maryland expressed a sentiment of many: “I am deeply
concerned by the lack of transparency surrounding this settlement and by the
fact that we still have no idea how many illegal foreclosures each bank
committed.”88
C. Challenges to Administrative Regulation
As these examples highlight, both government regulators and the public at
large benefit from regulated forms of mass dispute resolution. Private dispute
resolution can offer faster, more sophisticated, and in some cases, more
flexible forms of relief to large groups of similarly injured parties than can
courts. But government actors face other significant challenges in regulating
settlement systems, such as (1) policing deeply sophisticated transactions at a

category using the financial remediation matrix published in June 2012 as a guide, incorporating input from
various consumer groups.”).
84 Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of Currency, Statement from Comptroller of the Currency
Thomas J. Curry on the IFR Settlement (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/
2013/nr-occ-2013-4.html.
85 See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. & Office of the Comptroller of
Currency, supra note 82.
86 See Joe Mont, OCC’s Curry Defends End of Independent Foreclosure Reviews, COMPLIANCE WEEK
(Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.complianceweek.com/occs-curry-defends-end-of-independent-foreclosurereviews/article/280293/.
87 See, e.g., Julie Schmit, Foreclosure Settlement a Billion-Dollar Bust, USA TODAY (June 25, 2013,
12:36 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/06/24/independent-foreclosure-reviewpayments/2390073/ (citing the testimony of Lawrance L. Evans, Jr., of the GAO at an April 2013 Senate
hearing).
88 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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reasonable cost; (2) preserving transparency, participation, and flexibility; and
(3) ensuring such systems remain current and legitimate.
1. Cost
Regulation requires time, money, and effort. These costs inevitably
interfere with one of the primary advantages of large private settlement
systems—their efficiency.89 Commercial airlines continue to complain that
preset compensation for bumped passengers imposes costs that, in turn, are
unfairly passed onto all passengers in the form of increased airfare. And one of
the core problems with the Independent Mortgage Review program was the
expense and delay entailed in individualized review and federal oversight.
Sometimes regulators will determine that the value of efficiency outweighs
the cost of more regulation. In the mortgage foreclosure settlement,
government regulators ultimately abandoned the time-consuming, individual
review process in favor of efficient payments based on a simple grid. But
efficiency is only one of many important system values. Regulatory responses
must strike a desirable balance between the cost of new regulation and the
parties’ interests in accurate, transparent, and legitimate mass compensation.
2. Capture and Ossification
Regulators often delegate responsibility in private settlement systems to
improve efficiency. In doing so, they rely on the implicated parties’ expertise,
familiarity with the issues, and economies of scale. The danger is that they will
do so in coercive, inconsistent, or self-interested ways, such as when banks
underinvested in their investigation of shoddy mortgage foreclosure practices.
Many privatized forms of regulation suffer from this problem,90 which is
exacerbated rather than mitigated when regulators are “captured” by the very
industries they regulate.91 Indeed, some argue that the OCC’s decision to

89 See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency
Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 224–25 (1997).
90 See PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT
FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 6–8 (2007).
91 See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039,
1059–67 (1997) (describing the theory of agency capture—“the agency often becomes closely identified with
and dependent upon the industry it is charged with regulating”—and its development).
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delegate file reviews to the banks themselves may have been the result of
regulatory capture.92
Another danger of regulation is “ossification,” where agencies, encumbered
by administrative procedures and the threat of defending new regulations in
court, fail to adapt to changed circumstances.93 As an example, initial airline
regulations remained unchanged for over three decades before the Obama
Administration revisited them in 2008.94 Ossification is a particular problem
when administrative regulations prescribe specific awards through a rigid grid.
Such regulation may fail to account for inflation or the full range of variation
among injured parties that might emerge over time. This is particularly true of
airlines, which increasingly charge separately for services, like baggage fees,
that once were included in the final ticket price and were, thus, reimbursable.95
When government institutions fail to revisit and update settlement provisions
regularly, they risk legitimacy and accuracy.
3. Timing
Finally, timing matters. Even as ex ante regulation offers more certainty
and predictability, policymakers seeking to set appropriate compensation levels
in advance will invariably struggle. Among other things, individuals tend to
assign significantly different values to injuries before and after they experience
them, generally discounting their value in advance.96 Thus, even when
92 See, e.g., Helping Homeowners II, supra note 75, at 10 (statement of Sen. Robert Menendez,
Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Hous., Transp., & Cmty. Dev.) (“Since the OCC and the Federal Reserve
abandoned the review, to what extent will they be able to further examine whether certain banks committed
systematic errors in their foreclosures based on either preliminary results or based on information that they
gathered through regular bank examinations or other sources?”).
93 See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J.
1385, 1397–98 (1992) (describing ossification in the rulemaking process); see also Thomas O. McGarity, The
Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 533–36
(1997).
94 To be fair, “[t]he Department of Transportation considered updating these compensation amounts in
2001.” Blanchard, supra note 38, at 1801 n.6. But it delayed action because of the airline industry’s financial
woes following the September 11 terrorist attacks. Id. (citing Jane Costello, Airlines Cut Payments to Bumped
Flyers, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2002, at D1).
95 See Joe Sharkey, Checked Baggage Fee? That’s Not the End of It, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2013, at B8
(observing that “airlines are heavily into the game [of upselling], as they slice and dice every aspect of air
travel to find creative ways to charge fees for just about everything except the use of the restrooms”).
96 See Shane Frederick, George Lowenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, Time Discounting and Time
Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351, 382 (2002); Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D.
Wilson, Miswanting: Some Problems in the Forecasting of Future Affective States, in FEELING AND THINKING:
THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN SOCIAL COGNITION 178, 194 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000); Daniel Kahneman &
Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Utility Maximization and Experienced Utility, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 221, 224
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lawmakers and administrative agencies solicit direct input from interest groups
in advance of a dispute, the results may not adequately reflect their injuries.
Ex post settlement regulation presents different challenges. Although
policymakers may determine compensation more accurately after the fact, ex
post regulation may be uncertain, unpredictable, and frequently resolved
hurriedly behind closed doors. For example, part of the problem with the
Independent Mortgage Review may have been haste in designing and
announcing the program.
In sum, government regulation of out-of-court mass dispute resolution
systems involves great risks and rewards. Government regulation of private
settlement systems attempts to deliver the public goals of transparency,
accountability, and fairness, without compromising the private settlements’
strengths of efficiency, flexibility, and access.
III. REFORM
We agree with Professor Dodge that the advantages of private mass
settlement systems will only be realized with sufficient independent
oversight.97 Below, we offer two proposals: (1) consumer or other stakeholder
participation in the design of private resolution systems and (2) administrative
regulation designed to avoid coercive settlement practices and increase
transparency.
A. Stakeholder Participation
Involving consumers and other stakeholders in the design of private
settlement systems will increase both legitimacy and transparency.
Participation could take a number of different forms. Putative defendants
choosing mass settlement systems could voluntarily solicit opinions and advice
regarding the types and degree of process that will be perceived as fair98 or the
requisite notice to ensure that wavier of future rights is truly informed. For
example, they could employ focus groups to determine appropriate processes

(2006); Adam S. Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality, 59 DUKE L.J. 1105, 1150–54 (2010) (describing theory
of consumers’ “time-inconsistent preferences” and hyperbolic discounting).
97 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
98 See Tom R. Tyler, A Psychological Perspective on the Settlement of Mass Tort Claims, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1990, at 199, 204 (“[H]aving one’s day in court often leads to a more satisfactory
claiming experience than does a swift procedure in which litigants are minimally involved.”).
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and payouts for different types of injuries following an accident or incident.99
According to the Government Accountability Office, the banks that
participated in the Independent Mortgage Review and the National Mortgage
Settlement would have greatly benefited from borrower feedback on a range of
issues, from acceptable waiting periods and adequate compensation schemes,
to sufficient notice and ease of understanding of the requisite paperwork.100
Alternatively, prospective regulation could require parties to solicit
stakeholder participation as part of the dispute resolution process. As part of a
negotiated rulemaking, an agency could require a potential defendant to
negotiate with injured parties to produce a proposed recovery plan, which the
agency would then review and potentially adopt as an official administrative
response. Finally, like in Department of Labor guidelines for workplace
disputes, stakeholders themselves could participate in hearing, evaluating, or
even deciding claims.101
By soliciting and accounting for a wide variety of viewpoints, regulators
and potential defendants can increase the likelihood that settlement programs
will remain current. They can also increase the likelihood that these programs
will satisfy injured parties and members of the public at large. By requiring
potential defendants to solicit diverse viewpoints, regulators can bring the
programs out from behind closed doors, disseminating relevant information
about the procedures and substantive outcomes.
B. Administrative Regulation
With respect to settlement programs required by federal law, lawmakers
and administrative bodies should carefully consider the timing and scope of
any waivers sought by potential defendants, the transparency of the agreements
struck, and tools for monitoring private settlement systems. Both the deniedboarding regulations and the Independent Mortgage Review agreement provide
that by accepting compensation, parties do not waive their rights to pursue
additional compensation in court. But this is not always the case. Too
99 The GAO, for example, recently recommended similar “best practices” to improve the multibilliondollar Independent Foreclosure Review. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-277, FORECLOSURE
REVIEW: LESSONS LEARNED COULD ENHANCE CONTINUING REVIEWS AND ACTIVITIES UNDER AMENDED
CONSENT ORDERS 7 (2013) (recommending regulators use “tests or focus groups, to assess the readability of
the outreach materials” and “solicit input from consumer groups when reviewing initial communication
materials”).
100 See id.
101 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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frequently, claimants who participate in private dispute resolution
arrangements unwittingly waive their rights to sue.102 Prospective regulations
could address these situations, by prohibiting waiver as a condition of
participation entirely,103 barring waivers in emergency situations or that
frustrate regulatory policies,104 or at the very least, imposing disclosure
requirements that mandate that claimants knowingly consent to the waiver.105
Where appropriate, regulations could also require publication and
dissemination of recovery grids or formulas. Even when such information is
publicly available in the Federal Register, it may not be widely known, as is
the case with the airline regulations. Sometimes, it may therefore be
appropriate to require not only public disclosure, but also active dissemination
and educational efforts by the potential defendants.106
Finally, regulations should specify oversight and monitoring mechanisms.
As noted above, airlines are sometimes inconsistent in following the
promulgated compensation scheme, likely because they think they can get
away with doing so.107 And although federal regulators claimed to “spot
check” the banks’ work in the Independent Mortgage Review, they only
reviewed roughly 100,000 foreclosure files out of 4 million, far short of a
statistically reliable sample.108 These sorts of problems can and should be
avoided through specified oversight mechanisms, either in the governing
102

See, e.g., Campbell Robertson, Along Gulf, Many Wary of Promises After Spill: Remembering the
Fight for Money After Katrina, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2010, at A12; Josh Wingrove, BP Pulls Disputed Waiver
for Workers, GLOBE & MAIL, May 3, 2010, at A11 (describing allegations that BP sought “to pull the wool
over” the eyes of local fishermen by requiring litigation waivers as part of its compensation program in
violation of the Oil Pollution Act).
103 This is already the case for mass criminal restitution schemes, which bar consideration of future civil
recoveries. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(B) (2012) (“In no case shall the fact that a victim has received or is
entitled to receive compensation with respect to a loss from insurance or any other source be considered in
determining the amount of restitution.”); United States v. Cienfuegos, 462 F.3d 1160, 1168 (9th Cir. 2006)
(holding that the district court abused its discretion in considering the civil availability of restitution in a
criminal case).
104 The Oil Pollution Act, for example, bars waivers for “interim, short-term” emergency payments made
to aggrieved victims and businesses immediately after a spill. See 33 U.S.C. § 2705(a) (2012).
105 Such disclosures are already required by FINRA before disputes arise, as well as by CERCLA and the
Oil Pollution Act, after disputes arise. See supra Part I; see also 33 U.S.C. § 2714 (setting forth
“advertisement” requirements for “responsible part[ies]” of an oil spill).
106 Two months into its own compensation process, BP consulted with charter-boat crews to develop a
compensation template to account for the seasonal nature of the charter-fishing business. See Pete Spotts, BP:
We’ve Been Too Slow to Pay Oil Spill Claims, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 10, 2010), http://www.
csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0610/BP-We-ve-been-too-slow-to-pay-Gulf-oil-spill-claims.
107 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
108 See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 81; supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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regulations or the terms of a settlement agreement. The Obama
Administration’s new airline regulations, for example, require that airlines
report all bumped passengers to the Department of Transportation and publish
new compensation amounts in print and on their websites.109 Airlines must also
automatically adjust payments to passengers to account for inflation.110 In
including this provision, regulators responded to widespread criticism that the
DOT failed to effectively monitor and update airline regulations for thirty
years.

109
110

See 14 C.F.R. §§ 250.9–.10 (2013).
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.

